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The Racialism and Erasure of Academic Freedom
Nick J. Sciullo*
Academic freedom is the cornerstone of democratic education. A
vigorous defense of academic freedom demands a vigorous investigation of
freedom’s limitations. Today we grapple with the lingering legacies of the
USA PATRIOT Act,1 NSA spying,2 and aggressive law enforcement
surveillance regimes. The unfettered libertarian freedom many lionize is at
best elusive. While the question of what constitutes academic freedom
should be of central interest to academics, the related question of how
academics mitigate academic freedom is perhaps more interesting.
Professor Stanley Fish and Dean Robert C. Post passionately
demonstrate the need for academic freedom’s vigorous defense.3 Their
recent texts and talks illustrate a salient debate about what it means to be an
academic, and what it means to be free. Fish’s recent discussion in the
Opinionator, the online opinion companion of the New York Times,
demonstrates both the value of academic freedom as well as, based upon the
comments section, the healthy debate that supports and occludes this
freedom.4 But, more interesting yet, is the ways in which race elides careful
examination in academic freedom discussions.
Race (still) matters. Over fifty-five years ago, Ralph Ellison warned of
the blindness in United States culture that obscured difference, in favor of a
complex politics of colorblindness.5 He feared black people were at risk of
“becoming quite dull and grey.”6 Discussions of academic freedom often
suggest a blindness that occludes considerations of the ways in which
* Ph.D. candidate (Rhetoric and Politics), Department of Communication, Georgia State
University. M.S., Troy University; J.D., West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., University of
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1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2 Heidi Kitrosser, “Macro-Transparency” as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA
Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64 (2007).
3 See STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (Oxford University Press 2008);
ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (Yale Univ. Press 2013); MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C.
POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Yale Univ. Press 2011).
4 Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom Vindicated in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/academic-freedom-vindicated-in-brooklyn/;
Stanley
Fish, Academic Freedom in Brooklyn: Part Two, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedom-in-brooklyn-part-two/?_r=0.
5 RALPH ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN 435-36 (Vintage Int’l 1995) (1947).
6 Id. at 436.
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academic freedom discussions affect people of color and those who
research and write in critical race paradigms.
While the expansion of law reviews and online companions has
opened doors to more critically engaged scholarship, as well as nontraditional scholarship, one must remember much critical race scholarship
still appears in less prestige law reviews. Even if critical race scholarship is
seen as more mainstream now, there remains a view that positions critical
scholarship as somehow less worthy than traditional doctrinal and
theoretical scholarship.
Promotion and tenure committees often view race scholarship as lesser
quality than First Amendment, property, or M&A work. Detrimental as
well is the loss of personal satisfaction from placement in top journals.
Indeed, the ways in which any placement affects a scholar’s chance at
tenure is no small consideration. Scholars may be stigmatized as
“crits” or “not serious scholars.” Without expanding the ways in which
scholarship is considered relative to promotion and tenure as well as general
epistemological orientations and contributions to law and the academy,
much critical race scholarship might remain marginalized. How free are
academics, particularly non-tenured academics, to pursue their research
when race scholarship is maligned?
In closing, we should ask not only what academic freedom means
today and how we protect it, but also how academic freedom may be
experienced differently by scholars of color and those writing from critical
race perspectives.

